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INTRODUCTION
The perennial human quest for an answer to the existence of evil and its results is of
interest to every human being as everyone seems to be affected by pain and suffering. Justin
Hayward‟s lyrics reveal the more recent cultural Western articulation of the problem of evil:
“Why do we never get an answer/ when we‟re knocking at the door?/ With a thousand million
questions/ about hate and death and war?”1 Every culture poses this question in one way or
another. As pain, suffering, and evil are indisputable realities for Westerners and seemingly
widespread illusions for Easterners, in a sense, every person is influenced by evil (or the illusion
of evil). The westerner might complain of the propensity of evil while the oriental of the
powerful effects of the illusion of evil. Thus, every Weltanschauung has the responsibility to
provide an answer or an explanation to the problem of evil. The origin of evil becomes a
significant question for those who struggle to understand metaphysical evil. For the worldviews
that deny the reality of evil, there is still a need to explain the origin of its illusion; every
worldview must address the challenge of evil. The Shinto and Christian positions recognize the
reality of evil and attempt to respond in a coherent, comprehensive manner to the challenge it
poses, although their answers differ in many aspects.
The essence of Japanese culture, Shinto, is an amalgam of ideas and ways of doing things
that presents an optimistic worldview. Given Shinto‟s favorable disposition toward life, the
question of evil seems even more acute for this system. How does Shinto explain the reality of
evil and maintain its optimistic view of the world? Does it overlook the seriousness and reality
1
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of evil? Does the Shinto position offer a realistic response or an inadequate answer to the
problem of evil? This thesis attempts to discover and respond critically to these questions with
reference to the thought of Motoori Norinaga, an eighteenth century Shinto scholar, and compare
the Shinto view to an Augustinian Christian response.
J.W.T. Mason affirmed that we “know far more about the significance of the conceptions
of ancient Egypt, dead for thousands of years, than about the significance of Shinto which is the
most virile factor in the life of Japan.”2 He points out the considerable deficiency in the area of
Shinto studies, though Western scholarship of Shinto has made great advances in the last few
decades. Various reasons have been offered to explain the situation, but two in particular have
appeared in numerous writings and relate to the nature of Shinto: 1) its intuitive character; and 2)
its lack of philosophical sophistication. These Shinto characteristics will become evident as the
study progresses. However, before undertaking the task of understanding the Shinto concept of
evil, several ideas need to be addressed: 1) the view of Shinto referred to in this paper; 2) a brief
introduction to Norinaga‟s ideas; and 3) intuition, the Shinto epistemological approach to truth. I
will then explain two foundational aspects of the Shinto worldview, and Norinaga‟s concept of
evil, followed by a Christian response.

View of Shinto
The term “Shinto” covers many different types of religious expressions that developed
over the course of Japanese history. From the animistic, primitive form to the official state
religion to the various indigenous folk practices, Shinto can signify a range of diffuse beliefs.
The constant influx of foreign influences stimulated Shinto adherents to refine or transform their
views throughout the years. However, in each case, the old beliefs were not discarded but
2
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altered. At the same time, this indigenous religion also acted as an agent of transformation on
the foreign traditions. In addition, it is significant that most foreign beliefs that survived in Japan
were the ones congenial to the indigenous tradition. This syncretistic approach of the Japanese
and the continuous exchange of ideas between various systems produced a difficulty in defining
Shinto. Employing the analogy of a tree, Robert J. Wargo describes it as the molding and
sustaining factor of religious and philosophical thought:
Shintoist orientation is like the root system of a tree that has been subjected to
massive pruning and shaping by external forces. It is the shape and interlacing
network of branches that excite one‟s interest and admiration; but it is the roots—
which store and send back up vital nutrients—that underlie the dynamism of
growth and revitalize the cultural tree, which otherwise would die from injury to
its above-ground parts.3
As Wargo suggests, from an anthropological point-of-view, Shinto refers to the core
Japanese roots underpinning the Japanese culture. In the study of various traditions found in
Japan, scholars repeatedly describe concepts as “clearly Japanese” or “purely Shintoist.” The
frequent interchangeable use of “Japanese” and “Shinto” demonstrate that the latter term refers
to some cultural Japanese tendencies and not only to the indigenous religion of the people.
These purely Japanese ideas form the basis of Norinaga‟s view of Shinto called “Pure Shinto,” or
the “Way of the Gods”—or thus the Nationalist scholars affirm. This is the revived version of
ancient Shinto as understood by the proponents of the National Learning movement.
As the meaning of Shinto analyzed and referred to in this thesis is “Pure Shinto,” this
section will present its core concepts. At the foundation of Pure Shinto lies the belief in the
divinity of the emperor and, thus, the reverence for the Imperial House. Always an integral
factor of the indigenous religion, belief in the divine origin of the emperor was fully embraced
by the nationalists. As Norinaga developed this notion, he associated it to the belief in Japan as
3
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the “divine country.” In addition, Pure Shinto emphasized naturalness and simplicity as the way
of the kami and the goal of humans. To act “naturally” was the norm in ancient Japan, according
to Norinaga. Because the people were pure, their spontaneous actions equaled righteous
conduct. The internal connectedness between kami and humans was not distorted since the
people followed “the Way of the Gods.” Pure Shinto believes all of existence is divine spirit
characterized by creative spontaneity, or “the subconscious self-creative impetus,” as Mason
describes it.4 That explains the reason empiricism and teaching by emulation are primordial in
Shinto, as well as the cause behind the strong Shinto emphasis on feelings and spontaneous
action. As divine, humans have the kami-potential within themselves. This implies that it is
“natural” for a person to live as they “ought,” whatever that means. Human nature seen as an
extension of the nature of the universe elucidates the attitude of exalting subjective and
spontaneous action so characteristic of Pure Shinto. These basic beliefs of Pure Shinto will
continue to surface as Norinaga‟s thought is analyzed.
Short Introduction of Norinaga’s Ideas
Since no belief takes shape in a vacuum, a proper understanding of Norinaga‟s view of
evil is determined upon an understanding of his thought system. “The prince of Shinto
scholars,”5 he is recognized as one of the most influential scholars of the National Learning
movement, a movement that sought a revival of the ancient Shinto. In Motoori Norinaga: 17301801, Shigeru Matsumoto divides the study of Norinaga‟s life into four stages: childhood and
adolescence (1730-1751), young adulthood (1752-1763), adulthood (1764-1780), and old age
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(1781-1801). In analyzing Norinaga‟s thought, the author emphasizes the development of two
notions throughout each one of these stages, notions that define his thought: mono no aware,
which he developed mainly in the second stage of his life, and the “Ancient Way,” a concept on
which he focused in the last two stages of his life. First, one needs to appreciate the historical
context that influenced the development of Norinaga‟s ideas. I will offer a brief historical
synopsis of the religious and philosophical milieu preceding the emergence of the National
Learning movement. Then, I will expound on the two notions mentioned by Matsumoto that
appear so significant in the process of understanding Norinaga‟s thought.
In the sixth and following centuries, the introduction of Buddhism and Confucianism in
Japan produced a transformation of Shinto. The synthesis of Buddhism and Shinto influenced
the religious beliefs of the Japanese while Confucianism was used for the bureaucratic
organization of the government. From about 800 until 1600, Buddhism dominated the religious
and philosophical scene in Japan. After a period of internal warfare, Tokugawa Ieyasu unified
Japan and reorganized the country; the Tokugawa shogunate favored Neo-Confucianism, and the
result was the fall of Buddhism as the major philosophical and spiritual movement in Japan.
Shinto adherents, especially Shinto scholars and philosophers, were presented with two options:
either to synthesize with the new philosophical movement, or to develop their own system
independent of other intellectual traditions.6 Norinaga was part of the system that revolted
against the amalgamation of Shinto to any other religious belief and promoted the idea of
developing a purely Shinto worldview.
As part of the kokugaku movement, Norinaga advocated for the discovery of the ancient
traditions, or pure Japanese roots, unpolluted by foreign influences. He equated the ancient
6
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Shinto to the “Way of the Gods” and believed that truth can be found through the study of the
books that record the events of the gods, Kojiki and Nihon Shoki.7 His thought is based
especially upon the Kojiki, which seemed to have “something of a revelational meaning for
[Norinaga].”8 His affirmation that “the true Way is the same in every single country, but it has
been transmitted correctly in [the] Imperial land alone”9 reveals three aspects of Norinaga‟s
belief regarding Japan: the existence of a universal truth available to all, the Japanese
ethnocentrism, and the somewhat revelatory nature of the two classics.10 In another work, he
makes a similar remark: “[the true Way] permeates all nations within the Four Seas and is
transmitted exclusively in our Imperial Land.”11 To attain the truth, however, one needs to
reflect sincerely on the events of the Age of the Gods and needs an undefiled mind, a mind
purified of Chinese logic or influences.12 Reason cannot help one in the process of discovering
the truth because human intelligence is incapable of comprehending the profound principles of
the Way of the Gods.13

7

Though Norinaga believed that both ancient records, Kojiki and Nihon Shoki, present the truth of Way of
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Norinaga despised any metaphysical approaches to studying “the Way,” and rejected the
use of reason and logic in the pursuit of the truth. However, in his refutation of Confucian and
Buddhist thought, he consistently reasons and uses logic. Nonetheless, when faced with difficult
questions regarding his own views, he frequently dismisses them because they transcend human
understanding. For instance, when asked what the ultimate ontological cause is, he “It cannot be
known because there is no tradition transmitted about it.” He then continues, “But since it is a
matter far beyond the reach of the [human] mind and word, the very lack of tradition is quite
natural.”14 In addition, Norinaga presents the Way as “totally different, dissociated from the
teachings of . . . any other doctrine, having nothing whatsoever in common with them.”15 This is
a peculiar affirmation for one who believes that foreign ways are “peripheral branches of the true
Way.”16 A branch is not only associated with the trunk, but survives only through its connection
to the tree. In Tamakushige, Norinaga concedes that foreign ways may resemble the Way of the
Gods, which obviously contradicts his other statement mentioned above. Even though logic does
not hold a high value in Norinaga‟s system, he uses it to destroy the arguments of his opponents
while refusing to subject his system to its scrutiny.
Mono no aware is a key concept that influences many of Norinaga‟s views. Most
translators struggle to provide the exact meaning of the term “mono no aware” in another
language. Popular renderings in English for mono no aware have been “the moving power of
things,”17 “the pathos of things,”18 or “the sadness of things.”19 This concept, which Norinaga
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first applied to Japanese literature and later used it to explain other personal Shinto beliefs,
expresses the idea of sensitivity and deep feelings toward “naturalness.” Matsumoto defines
mono no aware as “man‟s emotional, aesthetic, and intuitive experience rather than experience
primarily based on will or reasoning.”20 This concept is strongly related to Norinaga‟s
understanding of the “pure” Japanese spirit which he tried to discover through the study of the
classical books, Kojiki and Nihon Shoki. A pure mind is one that experiences mono no aware.
The truth of the ancient Way cannot be reached by one who lacks the ability to acknowledge this
“pathos of things.” As Muraoka Tsunetsugu points out, “With [Norinaga] the spirit of the
Japanese poems [mono no aware], which avoided reason and revealed human feeling, was
ultimately the spirit of the Kami Way (Shinto) of antiquity.”21 Norinaga explains that one can
experience mono no aware only when s/he is open to the spirit of the thing that causes one to
experience deep emotion. He sees a connection between the person and the thing that causes
him to become sensitive; a bond between the two forms which produces the irresistible emotion.
The mono no aware concept becomes significant when one understands that Norinaga
believed Japan could return to living as it did during the Way of the Kami only if the people
would live in accord with human emotion and the “natural” way (or in accord to mono no
aware). Because everything came to life through the creative act of the musubi force, the innate
nature of the people is pure, and people should act according to their inborn instincts. In Hirata
Atsutane‟s words, this is equivalent to saying that the pure Japanese are “in spontaneous
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possession of the Way of the Gods.”22 They only have to access this way of living by following
their instincts. To live according to human desire, as it happened during the Age of the Gods,
involves the possession of a pure heart and mind, which is the condition with which the people of
the kami land are born.23 Desires cannot be legislated or guided through rules as in
Confucianism. The history of China proved, Norinaga believed, the inefficiency of morality.
Being defiled by the Chinese spirit, Japan came to have the same problems as China because
people stopped acting according to the instincts of their nature, which expresses itself through
mono no aware. One gets in touch with his or her “real heart” when he/she becomes conscious
of mono no aware. The ancient Japanese community was characterized by “naturalness” and
true living required a return to living according to this concept in Norinaga‟s view. Nonetheless,
even experiencing mono no aware and living this way needs to be subjected to the higher
standard, the Ancient Way.24 Norinaga believed that people who dedicated themselves to the
Ancient Way lived “moral” lives. “The ancient, natural, and simple state of things,”
characteristic of the Age of the Gods, is a state of being in which people are good without being
compelled to obey.25 One can see how Norinaga‟s views of reason and truth, mono no aware,
and “naturalness” are interrelated. This is significant because it reveals the reason behind
Shinto‟s lack of an ethical code or prescribed “rules” of morality.
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Intuitive Feelings and Truth
The intuitive nature of Shinto can produce reluctance to study this religion. Shinto
engages one‟s feelings, not reason. Why study it? Is not experience the only method of attaining
any insight into this Japanese religion? Picken agrees that “Shinto is indeed a religion that is
„caught‟ rather than „taught;‟ its insights „perceived‟ before they are „believed;‟ its basic
concepts „felt‟ rather than „thought.‟”26 Even the Japanese language shows “great emotional
nuance.”27 Nature itself is the teacher of Shinto. Analyzing religious concepts through reason
and logic is highly discouraged. Thus, experience becomes the standard of living because only
the spontaneous action, uninhibited by self-analysis, corresponds to the divine nature. The
monism of Shinto which exalts experience over reason reveals the motive behind the lack of a
desire to articulate doctrines, which is characteristic of most, if not all, Shinto adherents.
Given this Shinto conviction, one can object that any analysis of Shinto concepts is a
futile attempt. However, an understanding of the relation between intuitive feelings and truth
will reveal the contrary. A common objection of Shinto believers is that intuition cannot be
interpreted; thus, there is a lack of a binding doctrinal system that Shintoists should uphold.
However, the variety of contradictory convictions held by Shinto adherents provides evidence
that some type of analysis of their religious beliefs takes place. What else would explain the
existence of a multiplicity of ideas within this monistic religion? If the creative divine spirit ties
all of existence together and spontaneous, subconscious action expresses the divine nature, one
wonders what causes differences in beliefs or actions. How can spontaneous expressions of the
same thing contradict in so many ways? The reality of a variety of clashing views within Shinto
26

Stuart D.B. Picken, Essentials of Shinto: An Analytical Guide to Principal Teachings (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1994), xxxii.
27

Robert E. Carter, Encounter with Enlightenment: A Study of Japanese Ethics (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2001), 52.

10

points out that the intuitive feelings a Shinto adherent experiences must be subjected to
interpretation. The multiplicity of opinions and beliefs must be the result of interpretation, even
subconscious interpretation, on the part of the Shinto adherents. This interpretation does not
have to be conscious analysis to count as valid from a hermeneutical perspective. Thus, the
existence of a diversity of opinions within the Shinto monistic worldview demonstrates that even
intuitive feelings can and are subjected to of analysis.
One objection is to point out that the multiplicity of opinions among Shinto believers is
due to the lack of purity among them and not a result of the interpretation of intuitive feelings. If
they would return to the natural state of the Age of the Gods, this problem would not occur.
Norinaga would add that a cleansing from Chinese logic and influences is the first step toward
attaining that goal. However, this objection does not disprove the premise that intuitive feelings
can be interpreted; it only emphasizes that certain circumstances can hinder one from attaining
the truth.
Why is the question of whether feelings can be interpreted or not important? To realize
the significance, one needs to understand the relation between intuitive feelings and truth. First,
I will present the view of truth that guides this evaluation. 28 Second, I will emphasize the
consequence of accepting that feelings can be interpreted. As Douglas Groothuis put it, truth
exists and is knowable; it is objective, universal and exclusive. Language conveys truth through
propositions and no existential experiences can determine the nature of truth. Believing in an
objective truth makes one to accept also that a person can either know or not know something
about reality. If anything can be known, then “the language in which that knowledge is

28
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expressed in some way corresponds unequivocally to reality and the principle of noncontradiction applies.”29 Analysis of propositions can either correspond or not correspond to
truth. Even truths felt can inevitably be reduced to propositions. Since the value of a proposition
is dependent on its ability to present truth, the expression of intuitive feelings as propositional
truth can be subjected to analysis. One‟s opposition to critical investigation of intuitive feelings
does not insulate the truths expressed through feelings from analysis. Scholars have consistently
noted the Shinto affinity toward intuitively felt truth and aversion for logically discursive truth.
However, this does not change the fact that Shinto feelings can be reduced to propositions and,
thus, be analyzed. If the result of a critical evaluation of intuitions or feelings proves unsound,
the person holding them might have misunderstood them or their meaning; the possibility of a
wrong interpretation of “subconscious” or intuitive feelings exists. Applying felt truths to
everyday situations, as is characteristic of Shinto, involves some type of self-conscious
examination. While the process of conveying feelings into propositions can prove hard, it is not
impossible. Thus, the goal of this thesis is to analyze critically the Shinto concept of evil in
connection to Norinaga‟s thought even if some ideas are based on intuitions or feelings.

29
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TWO ASPECTS OF THE SHINTO WORLDVIEW THAT AFFECT
ITS VIEW OF EVIL
Interconnectedness of Kami, Humanity, and Nature
What better suggestion can I follow for this study than to take into consideration the
King‟s words to the White Rabbit in Alice in Wonderland: “‟Begin at the beginning,‟ the King
said gravely,‟ and go on till you come to the end: then stop.‟”30 To understand the Shinto
concept of evil, it is useful to understand first the Shinto view of the beginning of the universe.
Several implications of the Shinto cosmology influence the concept of evil as Norinaga‟s views
will reveal. Before attempting to provide a short summary of Shinto mythology which can raise
many objections, I will offer one explanatory note: this brief outline is based on an analytical
Western approach because, as Herbert pointed out, a Westerner “is practically unable to
appreciate a cosmology unless it is presented according to our western mode of thinking and
explaining, i.e. more or less intellectually.”31 Many might object to such an endeavor because it
imposes Western forms of thought upon the Japanese mythology. However, applying a rational
structure to mythology should not be rejected for two reasons: one, as Herbert remarked,
Westerners need to place concepts in categories in order to understand them better;32 and two,
since all truth can be reduced to propositions and be subjected to critical analysis, Shinto
30
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cosmology cannot escape examination. Thus, this section attempts to present an “intellectual,”
though brief, interpretation of Shinto cosmology33 and its implications regarding the concept of
evil.
Many scholars view the Kojiki as a political propaganda book written to provide
indisputable evidence for the emperor‟s right to rule. As Michael Ashkenazi expresses it, the
significance of the Izanagi and Izanami myth lies in its political underpinnings rather than in the
description of the creation story since the origin of humans, animals, and plants is not even
mentioned.34 The purpose of the myth is thus interpreted from a purely political perspective
seeing that it infers a divine relation between the kami and the royal family. However, Norinaga
viewed the myths as describing the events of the age of the kami which show people how to live
in the present. Since the Kojiki had an almost revelatory status for him, the inevitable
consequence was his acceptance of the emperor‟s divine right to rule and of the Japanese‟s duty
to obey.35 He cannot be accused of having any hidden agenda in interpreting the Kojiki in this
manner because his only desire was to understand the kami way in order to emulate it.
Herbert divides the mythology of Shinto into seven stages: “(1) The appearance of
differentiated non-material principles; (2) The emergence of solid matter; (3) The beginnings of
mortal life; (4) The establishment of separate rulers for heaven and earth; (5) The consolidation
of the earth; (6) The conquest of the earth by the heavenly powers; and (7) The final union
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between the powers of heaven and earth.”36 The focus of this section is on the section
immediately preceeding the Izanagi and Izanami‟s myth and the events following.
The Shinto myth states that there were seven generations of celestial deities that have
sprung out of the primeval chaos. The last pair of the heavenly deities, Izanagi (He-WhoInvites) and Izanami (She-Who-Invites), was ordered to descend to earth and, as a result,
accomplished two things: they created the terrestrial world and gave birth to the earthly deities.
After giving birth to the kami of fire, Izanami died and went to the Land of Yomi (Land of Death,
also known as the Land of Pollution). Izanagi attempted to bring his wife back from the abode
of death and. When he reached the Nether World to request her return, he was commanded not
to look upon her. He disobeyed and was filled with terror at the sight of his beloved appearing in
a state of decomposition. His action caused evil spirits to pursue him, but Izanagi succeeded in
escaping. After his return to the upper world, he performed purification in the ocean and as the
result of his cleansing, further kami emerged, including the three ruling deities, Amaterasu,
Tsukiyomi, and Susanoo. However, the myth fails to discuss the creation of man and it ends
with the connection of the first emperor to the gods.37
The implications of the creation myth for the Shinto adherents are diverse. Shinto
mythology produced the belief in the divine human potential and in the connectedness of nature
and humans. According to the myth, humanity is understood as descending from the kami and

36
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not as being “created” in the sense in which Christianity understands the term. There is no deity
creating and sustaining the universe apart from itself. Picken sees the relation between the kami
and the creation of humanity as equivalent to a certain type of evolutionary theory.38
Metaphysically, the Shinto gods and humans have the same essence. It is no wonder that Shinto
adherents believed in an inherent superiority of the Japanese people, as Chikafusa‟s statement
demonstrates: “Great Yamato [Japan] is a divine nation. It is only our land whose foundations
were first laid by the divine ancestor.”39 From this follows the idea propounded by Norinaga that
only Japan is a “pure land.” In his writing, the corollary thus proved is that all other lands are
impure, which means that all people who are not Japanese are to be viewed as polluted.40 Even
if a Shinto believer avoids drawing such a strong conclusion, it logically follows from
Norinaga‟s theology. Nonetheless, my purpose in presenting this Shinto belief is not to
underline the Japanese ethnocentrism, but to emphasize the Shinto conviction of the Japan‟s
purity, a concept relevant to the discussion on evil.
Shinto cosmology and the Japanese view of human nature are closely interrelated and
generate a belief in a lack of evil in a moral sense. The same force or creative principle called
musubi, the “mysterious productive spirit,” is manifested in all living forms. 41 As a result, the
human race, the world, and kami are metaphysically indistinguishable. Humanity is not created
by the kami, but proceeds from kami. However, the kami are material instances of musubi. The
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traditional Shinto also considers the intrinsic life-creating principle of the kami to be available to
every person, from which comes the assumption of man‟s potential for good .42 While accepting
the universality of musubi‟s influence in creation, its interpretation should not be conceived of as
an ultimate cause in the same way the Christian God is understood though musubi connects all of
reality. The corollary of this belief is that humans, as children of kami, are inherently good. As
there is no ethical code one has to obey, all actions he or she performs with a pure mindful heart
are good. All evil actions must be caused by external forces since an inherently good person
cannot act in an evil way. Thus, evil in a moral sense lacks meaning for a Shinto adherent.
A lasting influence of mythology in Japanese culture, as Picken sees it, is the Shinto
concept of “spontaneous creativity.”43 With no transcendent deity guiding the creation process,
the spontaneity of the various kami creating the human race influenced the evolution of the
world. This explains the Japanese tendency to rely on naturalness. Mason actually equates
Shinto with the creative impetus, or “the spontaneous impulse of life seeking freedom of
action.”44 As Norinaga‟s works reveal, this idea survived throughout the centuries and became a
characteristic concept of Shinto thought. The implications for the concept of evil are numerous,
the major one being the view of evil as natural occurrences in the process of generating growth.45
Spontaneous actions produce results by trial-and-error, which explains the reality of evil.
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Purity-Pollution
The concept of purity-impurity runs like a continuing thread through all Shinto sects and
is recognized as a thoroughly Japanese idea. Shintoists do not trust in words very much in the
process of verbalizing their convictions and most are unable to explain their doctrines.
Nevertheless, the views of reverence for the pure and disdain for the polluted exist in all Shinto
sects no matter how different their convictions about other concepts. From the Japanese
obsession for bathing to the structure of shrines, all of Shinto emphasizes the importance of
purity, which can be understood better in contrast to pollution. These two concepts are
acknowledged as purely Japanese features and all discussions of Shinto take them into
consideration.
After studying the Japanese folk religions, the anthropologist Emiko Namihira discovered
that the Japanese life is “structured” through three concepts: hare, kegare, ke. Namihira argues
that all religious elements are systematized through these categories. His studies reveal the
crucial relevance of “purity” and “impurity” for the Japanese. As many understand Shinto as
being an amalgam of ideas and beliefs, Namihira exposes the presence of some conceptual
categories that provide “structure” to all beliefs assimilated by the Japanese. Namihira‟s
definitions of the terms represent a starting point for a discussion of Japanese purity and
impurity:
Kegare can be glossed as representing all phenomena manifesting (or leading to)
dissolution, decomposition, and disorganization; hare as representing all
phenomena manifesting orderliness, purity (cleanness), and productivity. Kegare
and hare are both categories of the “sacred” and as such stand in opposition to the
category of ke, which can be glossed as “the profane.” Ke is an unmarked,
residual category, and can be glossed as representing “the common,” “the usual,”
or “the ordinary,” i.e., the greater part of human experiential phenomena.46
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In addition to demonstrating their importance, Namihira also explains the structure of the
mythical world in view of the three concepts: 1) the Plain of High Heaven associated with hare;
2) the Central Land of the Reeds-Plain related to ke; and 3) the Land of Hades connected to
kegare. The first area is found above the Land of the Reeds-Plain (earth) and contains the living
quarters of the heavenly deities. The second “plain” is inhabited by the earthly gods and the
people whereas Hades is the “house” of the dead.47 Whether the people involved in the studies
lived in rural or urban areas, the presence of each of the three categories in varied locations
demonstrates their significance in the Japanese life. Sometimes, communities place a greater
emphasis on one of the notions, but without discarding the others. The presence of the concepts
of hare, ke, and kegare throughout Japan indicates their “Japaneseness” and the necessity of
understanding them.

Purity
In Shinto, purity is the highest value. It is related to the hare concept described by
Namihira. Many identify purity as representing the following four aspects: cleanness,
brightness, rightness, and straightness. 48 Sometimes, two of these terms can combine to form a
new one. Purity synthesizes the concepts of truth, goodness, and beauty. Thus, it is clear why it
became to be appreciated as the highest concept in Japan. Clean (sei) refers to freshness and
ritual purity. Bright (mei) implies being happy while right (sei) has a connotation of correctness.
Straight (choku) signifies the idea of honesty or frankness. In the Shinto understanding,
47
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purification as expressed through these aspects refers to the ideal state of one‟s heart and mind.49
This condition, according to Thomas Kasulis, constitutes “being as one truly is.”50 Thus, purity
is related to naturalness, or the initial state of the ancient Japan as Norinaga explained it. To be
pure is to reflect the unpolluted Japanese nature as it has been in the beginning.
Only a pure mind and heart, called in Japanese makoto no kokoro or simply magokoro,
can mirror the kami-world and the divine aspect inherent within each one.51 Thus, as magokoro
refers to the complete person, purity becomes essential to one‟s spiritual growth. Makoto no
kokoro consists of three terms: makoto (“truth,” “genuineness,” or “sincerity”), no (a possessive
particle “of”), and kokoro (“heart and mind”). Of the three, the hardest to define is kokoro,
which designates both “heart” and “mind,” both the affective and cognitive abilities of a person.
Lafcadia Hearn defines kokoro as “spirit; courage; resolve; sentiment, affection, and inner
meaning.”52 This definition points out that kokoro encompasses the emotions and spiritual life.
Kasulis finds “mindful heart” to be a better translation of the term because it implies both the
person‟s emotive responsiveness to the kami-world as well as his or her willingness to encounter
that world.53 One experiences the whole only in proportion to his sensitivity to the kami-world.
Spontaneity is involved, but as a result of one‟s awareness of the spiritual world. On one hand,
the attitude of receptivity of the kami-world depends on the purity of the person and, on the other
hand, purity leads to even greater receptivity. Thus, there is an interrelation between one‟s
openness to the spiritual world and his/her purity, a relation that causes pure, spontaneous action.
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The meaning of makoto no kokoro reveals the complex implications of the purity concept in
Shinto spirituality.
Some aspects of purity are better understood in the context of relationships from a
Japanese perspective as Shinto sees every human as part of the kami-world, or the whole.
Without purity, the internal relation to the kami is lost—which explains the reason this value is
seen as the most essential. To illustrate the relation between a pure man and the kami, magokoro
is like a clean mirror that reflects the light of the kami. However, dust (a symbol of pollution)
can collect and obstruct the ability of the mirror to emulate the kami-world, as the person loses
the interconnectedness to the whole.54 Beside the relationship to the kami world, the relations to
the other people are also influenced by purity or the lack of purity. A person lacking honesty (an
aspect of purity) would obstruct his connection to the other members of the community.
Everyone agrees that correctness and honesty should characterize one‟s interactions to others.
From the Shinto viewpoint, in addition to sincerity, brightness (cheerfulness) should also be
considered a necessary characteristic of societal relationships. The various aspects of purity
represent what one‟s attitudes toward others should be: honest, correct, happy, and genuine.55
However, a lack of purity hinders one‟s relationship either to the whole (the kami-world) or the
other people.
In a “moral sense,” purity is goodness.56 However, Shinto should not be understood in
moral terms. Although the concepts of purity and impurity are related to the Shinto ethics, “there
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is no fixed and unalterable moral code” in Shinto.57 Spiritual advancement is tied to cleanness
and brightness, but the focus is not necessarily on action.
Aspects of purity also find expression in a variety of cultural ways. The Shinto Shrine is
a symbol of purity (cleanness, brightness, rightness, and straightness). The torii gate delineates
between the outside world of pollution and the kami-world of purity while the ceremonial act of
rinsing one‟s hands and mouth before entering the presence of the kami emphasizes cleanness.
Even the architecture of shrines and Japanese art underline the Shinto concept of the pure.
First, the rebuilding of the Grand Shrine of Ise every 20 years symbolizes the Shinto appreciation
of freshness and brightness. Second, the clean, simple lines of shrines located within or close to
nature emphasize clarity and purity. A straight line in the Japanese mindset is considered
“inherently beautiful”58 in contrast to crooked lines that symbolize impurity. Identifying the
straight and simple pattern of the traditional Japanese flower arrangement, ikebana, with nobility
and beauty demonstrates the Japanese commendation for meijoseichoku.59

Pollution
Shintoists most commonly use two terms for pollution: tsumi and kegare (a more
ritualistic term). Tsumi, translated as impurity, has a broad range of meanings including
“pollution,” “sickness,” and “disaster” as well as “error.”60 Aston describes tsumi as things
disturbing to the gods. In addition, Norinaga divides the tsumi of Shinto into three categories:
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“uncleanness, sin or crime, and calamity.”61 However, most scholars recognize the tendency of
ancient Shinto to focus on ceremonial uncleanness rather than moral guilt. Since kami and
humans are manifestations of musubi, pollution could also be defined as anything that interrupts
the flow of this power or separates one from it. Thus, tsumi is seen as evil because it disrupts the
connection to the spiritual world. The analogy of dust on a mirror helps define impurity:
“pollution is like the dust that collects on a mirror; it inhibits our ability to see clearly the fact
that we are instances and reflections for the ground of vitality itself.”62
Probably the most important feature in understanding the Japanese mind regarding the
concept of impurity is the fact that pollution as sin or offence is uncommon in Shinto writings.
George Sansom points out the undeveloped correlation in ancient Shinto between impurity
(pollution) and sin and its effect on understanding the concept of evil:
The conception of sin, as distinct from uncleanness, is wanting, or rudimentary,
and throughout their history the Japanese seem to have retained in some measure
their incapacity to discern, or this reluctance to grapple with the problem of Evil.
Such a statement, once committed to writing, forthwith challenges contradiction
in the writer‟s own mind, but it represents, if imperfectly, a truth; and much that is
baffling in the study of their history, from ancient to modern times, becomes
clearer when one remembers that they have never been tortured by the sense of
sin.63
Pollution contains a connotation of sin but it is usually seen in collective terms. Thus,
actions are deemed wrong because they can bring punishments upon the whole group. The focus
is not on the action itself but on the effects of the deed. This idea reappears throughout the years
in some of the Japanese writings and it reveals an aspect of Shinto ethics.
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Two accounts in the Kojiki discuss the concepts of purity and impurity, thus disclosing
characteristic Shinto attitudes toward the two. The mythological account of Izanagi‟s lustration
in the waters is said to be the origin of the ritual of purification. After his flight from the Land of
Yomi, He-Who-Invites recognizes his need for cleansing himself of impurity: “Nay! Hideous! I
have come to a hideous and polluted land,—I have! So I will perform the purification of my
august person.”64 Norinaga suggests that the repetition of the “I have” idiom (ari keri in
original) was intended to convey the idea of lamentation.65 Izanagi seemed to be the first one to
associate death and ills with pollution. He also believed that purification could provide the
necessary expiation from impurity. Following his cleansing ritual, several evil kami originated
from the filth Izanagi contracted in the Land of Death. According to Anesaki, “these evil spirits
are believed to be still lingering among men and to cause evil and trouble.”66 Since the myths in
the Kojiki describe the deeds of the deities that point to the Way,67 this specific action might
teach more than the origin and significance of purification. Even though the next deities that
were born as a result of Izanagi‟s lustration had the purpose of rectifying the evil ones, this
mythological account fails to address the perplexing question of why evil gods were birthed as a
result of his purification. Furthermore, the effects of Izanagi‟s ritual and the Great Purification
Ritual differ. While in the former evil deities are born after the god‟s rite, in the latter the
impurities are thrown upon some type of vicarious object that will eventually be taken back to
the Yomi land. The first purification ritual introduced into the world the evil deities that are
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inflicting pain and trouble, effects that the Great Purification Ritual seeks to remove. One can
only wonder what assurance a Shinto believer has regarding the efficacy of a purification ritual
since even a god‟s rite falls short of its purpose.
In addition, Izanagi‟s account underlines the old Shinto belief that pollutions refer to
things that happen to people or are external to them. The male deity contracted the impurity
upon his contact with the Yomi Land, a polluted territory. This mythological account teaches
that pollution can befall a person and does not depend on one‟s deed. A person does not usually
bring evil (impurity) upon oneself. While Shinto adherents believe personal actions can produce
impurity in one‟s life, the tendency to emphasize external factors as causes of pollution explains
the lack of guilt in Shinto. The pragmatic Japanese shuns impurity because of its negative
consequences rather than its inherent nature. There is not much concern with the “wrong” or evil
of an action just because it is bad. Ancient Shintoists do not have an understanding of a moral
retribution for their evil acts as a just result of wrong actions. In this context, tsumi (impurities)
refer most frequently to “causes of misfortune.” In other words, pollution is a cause of
misfortune or inauspiciousness and needs to be removed through purification because it disturbs
the well-being of the person affected.
Shinto pragmatism explains the failure to focus on or address the dimension of one‟s
inner life because, as long as it does not impact the quality of everyday life, one‟s thought life is
insignificant. The idea of purification of evil thoughts seemed to be a foreign concept in old
Shinto68 and the concept of moral evil did not influence the religious community in any
significant way. Moreover, as it was mentioned, even personal wrong actions were seen as a
temporary affliction caused by some external agent, usually evil spirits. Norinaga even affirmed
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that evil actions are enacted by people who are possessed of evil gods. Thus, there lacked a
belief in responsibility, and purification was sought for the benefit of the person, not from a
desire to become morally better or because an action goes against a divine law.
Another instance in which purification is mentioned in the Kojiki took place after the
death of emperor Chiu-Ai. As the empress divinely possessed promised the future possession of
Korea, the monarch disbelieved and caused the deities to become angry. Immediately after that,
the sovereign died. Astonished by the turn of the events, the Prime Minister ordered the
purification of the land since the death of the emperor was believed to have a defiling effect.
The urgency felt by Noble Takeuchi to purify the whole land before addressing the deities again
is noteworthy.69 By this time, the belief in the efficacy of the purification rite must have been
well-established since it was the first thing the court decided to do after the monarch‟s death. In
a sense, this account demonstrates the centrality of purity-impurity concept in Shinto thought and
reveals the Shinto focus on the effects of impurity upon the community.
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EVIL IN MOTOORI NORINAGA’S THOUGHT
Any discussion of evil in reference to Norinaga‟s thought must show the problems that
arise within that system‟s accounts of kami and evil—one cannot apply the definitions of other
Shinto systems to attack Norinaga‟s view. Thus, this section deals with the concept of evil as
understood by Norinaga. First, I will discuss the three mythological stories that influenced his
view. Second, I will present Norinaga‟s understanding of the cause of evil. Third, several
definitions of evil based on Norinaga‟s writings are provided.

Evil in Shinto Mythology
Three stories in Shinto mythology influenced the development of the concept of evil:
Izanagi‟s visit to the Land of Yomi, his purification ritual after this visit, and Susanoo‟s
behavior. Izanagi‟s visit is the first account in the Kojiki that presents a reason for the Shinto
belief in the ultimate victory of good over evil. This creates a dilemma if understood in light of
the other Shinto beliefs—a topic discussed in the next section. The second episode brings into
the discussion of good and evil two important notions, magatsubi (“spirit of disorder”) and naobi
(“rectifying spirit”).70 They will be discussed later since they influenced Norinaga‟s thought
greatly. The Susanoo myth reveals several problems for the Shinto conception of evil and
especially for Norinaga‟s view as it provides more information regarding the nature of kami. In
the development of the argument, by resorting back to the other Shinto beliefs, the interrelation
of various beliefs and their influence of the concept of evil will become more evident.
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Izanagi’s Visit to Hades
The grief Izanagi experienced after his spouse‟s death caused him to travel to the Yomi
Land to find a way to bring her back. The female god was not able to respond to Izanagi‟s
request to return because she had eaten of “the furnace of Hades.”71 Thus, she had to inquire of
the deities of Hades if she could return to the world with her husband and left her spouse with the
command not to look upon her. Since his wife was taking a long time, Izanagi became curious
and looked at her body which turned out to be a repulsive image: a rotting body filled with
maggots. His disobedience evoked Izanami‟s anger and caused her to demand that the evil
deities pursue him. Because the deities of Hades failed to catch Izanagi, Izanami decided to
chase him, but he eventually escaped. Just before Izanagi‟s flight from the polluted land, the
divine couple shares a fiery last exchange. Their conversation provides a foundational account
concerning the prevailing of good. The female asserted: “I will in one day strangle to death a
thousand of the folks of thy land.” To which, Izanagi responded: “I will in one day set up a
thousand and five hundred parturition houses. In this manner each day a thousand people will
surely be born.”72 Though the episode reveals the inevitability of evil, it also explains the Shinto
optimism in the triumph of good over evil. Norinaga shared this view with many other Shinto
adherents. He emphasized this idea even more through his discussions about the two notions,
magatsubi and naobi, first developed in relation to Izanagi‟s cleansing ritual.
Izanagi’s Purification Ritual
Izanagi‟s desire to reunite with his wife brought him into contact with the filth and
pollution of Hades which made the male deity realize the necessity of performing a cleansing
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ritual.73 This event reveals two insights about the Shinto perception of pollution: 1) is inevitable;
and 2) is caused by external forces. Izanagi‟s actions that follow his return from Hades have
been interpreted in various ways. One characteristic of myth interpretation has been the
emphasis on the spiritual and mystical meanings of the stories. For example, Yamakage finds a
philosophical implication or hidden meaning behind each one of Izanagi‟s acts. The god‟s deed
of thrusting his staff in the sand resulted in the birth of Tsukitatsufunado no kami, or “Deity
Thrust-Erect-Come-Not-Place,”74—an action symbolizing the end of his journey of illusion.75
The deity born as a result of Izanagi‟s discarding his cloth from the upper body was
Wazurainoushi no kami, translated by Chamberlain as Deity Master-of-Trouble. This act was a
symbol of Izanagi‟s liberation from any anxiety.76 Whatever the interpretation, every Shinto
recognizes the importance of Izanagi‟s cleansing action for future interpretations of the Shinto
view on purity and pollution, basic Shinto ideas. The deities born as a result of Izanagi‟s
ablutions can be divided in two categories: evil deities and good deities. The filth “contracted
from the polluted, hideous land,”77 caused the birth of the evil deities, Yasomagatsubi no kami
and Ohomagatsubi no kami.78 After the pollution was removed, the good deities, the rectifying
deities, became alive: Kamunaobi no kami and Ohonaobi no kami. The last three kami produced
from Izanagi‟s washing of his left eye, of his right eye, and of his nose were Amaterasu (Sun
Deity), Tsukiyomi (Moon Deity), and Susanoo (Brave-Swift-Impetuous-Male-Augustness).
73

Ibid., 84.

74

Ibid.

75

Yamakage, Essence of Shinto, 95.

76

Ibid.

77

Chamberlain, Kojiki, 84.

78

Their names were translated by Chamberlain as Wondrous-Deity-of-Eighty-Evils and Wondrous-Deityof-Great-Evils.

29

Because of the significance of the two notions, magatsubi and naobi, for Norinaga‟s
thought, it is necessary to offer a brief analysis of the terms. Describing Norinaga‟s view of
maga, Matsumoto states that “in ancient usage [maga] means every kind of evil or
inauspiciousness and is identical with kegare (filth, pollution) or kitanashi (filthy).”79 Maga is
more than just “curvature” or “crooked,” as Norinaga‟s contemporaries understood the term. It
is the equivalent of all that is not right.80 In his essay about the Fire God, Norinaga affirms:
The two pillar gods Izanagi and Izanami gave birth to our land and all the deities.
Until they produced Fire God, there were only good things and no evil
[magagoto]. As a result of giving birth to the Fire god, Izanami passed away, and
evil began in the world. Therefore, because the Fire God stands at the border
between the end of good and the beginning of evil, he is the deity joining good
and evil.81
This paragraph contains many insights regarding Norinaga‟s view of evil. For now, it is
important to emphasize that he understood magagoto (“crooked things”) to refer to all evil
though people of later ages meant only “crooked” when referring to maga. In addition, as bi
denotes “the mysterious spirit,” Norinaga believed that magatsubi means “the mysterious spirit
of evils.”82 Thus, Norinaga indicates Magatsubi no kami to be the evil deity and later he presents
him as the cause of all evil in the world. The immediate birth of Naobi no kami after
Magatsubi‟s birth demonstrates that evil deities cannot ultimately triumph over the good kami,83
a similar notion to the one portayed in the account of Izanagi‟s conversation with Izanami.
Norinaga believed nao in naobi meant “to rectify” which caused Matsumoto to render naobi as
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“the mysterious spirit of rectifying evils.”84

However, as maga refers to all evil, nao indicates

the removal of all evil, not only the straightening of crooked ways or things. Some recent Shinto
scholars reject Norinaga‟s interpretation of Magatsubi and Naobi and regard it as a
misinterpretation of the ancient texts, “a theology created by Norinaga himself.”85 However,
Norinaga‟s understanding of the two deities is a distinguishing characteristic of his thought
regarding the concept of evil. In addition, it reveals a problem within his system; his
interpretation of the Age of Kami is grounded in the battle of good and evil, two Chinese ethical
categories that he rejected as flawed.86 Norinaga regarded all evils, inaspicious things as the
result of Magatsubi‟s actions and all good, auspicious things as the effect of Naobi‟s deeds.
Thus, a significant point regarding Norinaga‟s conception of evil drawn from his explanations is
the equation of good to pure and auspicious and of evil to impure and inauspicious, a common
feature of ancient Shinto, and an idea I will analyze later.87

Susanoo Myth
The third account in Shinto mythology that elucidates the view of evil even more is the
episode of Susanoo‟s banishment from the heavenly realm by both Izanagi and the Heavenly
Deities. Susanoo‟s account could be divided into four parts: 1) his disobedience of Izanagi‟s
command to rule the seas; 2) his amok behavior as a result of his visit of the Heavenly Realm; 3)
84
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Amaterasu‟s hiding in the cave because of Susanoo‟s evil reaction; and 4) Susanoo‟s banishment
to earth where he restores the peace in the land of Izumo. After Izanagi orders Susanoo to rule
the seas, the latter refuses because he desires to visit his mother in the Nether Distant Land. This
attitude causes Izanagi to expel Susanoo from the heavenly world. 88 Norinaga interprets
Susanoo‟s longing to visit Izanami in the Yomi Land to show a certain kinship between him and
that land which demonstrates the wickedness of his nature.89
After his banishment, Susanoo decides to visit his sister Amaterasu. Not being certain of
Susanoo‟s intentions, Amaterasu proposes they should enter into a contest that would prove the
truth of his intentions. Susanoo wins, but Amaterasu refuses to recognize his victory. Her act
angers him and he commits various evil actions, which scare Amaterasu. This makes her decide
to hide, which causes darkness in both the heavenly and the earthly realms. After Amaterasu is
tricked into coming out of the cave, the heavenly deities also decide to expel Susanoo from their
world.
Norinaga‟s commentary on the story of Amaterasu‟s seclusion points out that while
Susanoo‟s actions exhibit his evil nature, the account also reveals Amaterasu‟s power to restrain
the emergence of more evils in the world.90 As the Sun Deity hides in the cave, darkness occurs
in both the heaven and the earth. However, she eventually comes out and light is restored to the
lands. First, Norinaga affirms, Amaterasu‟s preeminence over all the other deities is displayed as
both realms depend on her activity. Second, this story provides another proof that good will
ultimately triumph over evil. However, one cannot appreciate the importance of the story for
Norinaga if s/he fails to understand that good and evil always alternate. Norinaga‟s view of this
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mutual generation of good from evil and evil from good is summarized in the following
paragraph:
The principle that good events and bad events follow each other in constant
succession, which can be seen in all of the things within the world, in each
generation, in each moment of time, great and small, is based upon intentions in
place at the beginning of the Divine Age. The workings of this principle began
with the joining of [Izanagi and Izanami], when the islands and all the deities
were born, and extended until the birth of the three treasured children and the
command that they divide [authority]. From their joining throughout the birth of
the deities everything was good, until with the birth of the fire deity, evil things
began with the departure of the mother deity. Since the land of yomi is an evil
place and the female deity went there, evil began to happen in the world as well.
Since the male deity returned to this world, after having had contact with this evil,
the world as a whole came to be evil. Therefore, upon his return to the apparent
world, he purified himself. First, the Magatsuhi deity appeared from the filth of
the yomi; then when that filth was purified, cleansed, and rectified, the three
treasured children appeared. When Amaterasu ruled over the heavenly plain, then
once again everything became good again. This then is the pattern of this world.
Therefore think carefully about this progression, and you will understand the
principle that guides the production of good from evil and evil from good.
Moreover, you will know the principle that even if there is evil, it will not triumph
over good in the end [emphasis added].91
Here, Norinaga interprets all events in view of “good” and “evil,” two Chinese categories
he frequently dismissed, as it was mentioned. An inevitable progression from good to evil and
then back to good takes place in every age. In addition, it seems that the corruption of the good
is inescapable. Izanagi‟s state of impurity caused by his visit to Hades demonstrates that
defilement (an evil) can affect any being.92 Though a person can try hard to avoid pollution,
there is not much assurance for the Shinto adherent that she can accomplish it. While it is true
that one can go through the purification rituals to return to the pure condition (the ultimate good),
there seems to be no guarantee that a human being can maintain that pure, good state even if all
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precautions are taken. Thus, it appears that Shinto fails to prove it is the optimistic worldview its
adherents claim it to be.
Another noteworthy point regarding Susanoo‟s myth relates to his behavior in the land of
Izumo after his banishment from the heavenly world. As the Kojiki records his evil deeds toward
his sister, one wonders what caused the significant difference in his conduct after reaching the
earthly world. As soon as he reached Izumo, Susanoo (Brave-Swift-Male-ImpetuousAugustness) decided to help its inhabitants by killing the eight-forked serpent that created
devastation in the land. From being the creator of havoc in the heavenly realm, he becomes the
author of peace in the earthly world. First, this indicates that both good (pure) and evil (impure)
are aspects of the kami nature. As Mason points out, “Divinity does not mean, in Shinto,
absolute purity.” He continues, “[v]irtue and vice both characterize divine spirit.”93 But another
explanation of Susanoo‟s actions can be seen through the interpretation of events in view of the
anthropologist Namihira‟s trichotomous structure of the world. If the heavenly world is the
“pure” world and the Earthly realm represents ke, the “ordinary,” then it is easy to understand
how one‟s action can be considered impure in the Plain of High Heaven, but is regarded as
normal in the Central Land of the Reed-Plains.94 As Chamberlain mentions, Susanoo‟s actions
are “evil” in heaven, but his heart becomes “pure” once he reaches the land of the Reed-Plains
because the standard of purity is lowered on earth.95 Regarding the differences in describing
Susanoo in the Kojiki, Namihira points out, “As he moved from one world to another his
„personality‟ changed: his behavior was called „violence‟ in the Plain of High Heaven, „the
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bravery‟ in the Central Land of the Reed-Plains, and „the authority‟ in the Land of Hades.”96 If
Namihira is correct in applying the three theoretical concepts to each world and thus describing
Susanoo‟s behavior, Norinaga‟s description of Susanoo is wrong. Norinaga interprets Susanoo‟s
conduct as a sign of his evil nature unaffected by the purity of the land. The kokugagu scholar
seems to accept the identification of both the heavenly and earthly realms with purity in contrast
to Namihira. In describing the first state of the Age of the Kami, Norinaga indicates the purity
and naturalness of both plains. In addition, Shinto regards the whole world as “sacred” because
of the kami nature that permeates it. Otherwise, the human nature would not have been pure, an
integral belief of his Ancient Way thought.97 If Norinaga‟s conception is used in the
interpretation of Susanoo‟s actions, it seems that good and evil “struggle” within his person. The
other solution would be to regard evil as an external, separate force, but that gives birth to a
dualistic view of the world. Since Shinto rejects a dualistic interpretation of the world, evil must
be accepted as an internal aspect of the divine nature. In conclusion, at least in Norinaga‟s
thought, the Susanoo myth demonstrates that good and evil are aspects of divinity. In a sense,
deity in Shinto possesses an ambivalent nature.
Norinaga’s Interpretation of The Tale of Genji
Written in eleventh century, The Tale of Genji is considered by some the first modern
novel. A story of illicit love, the novel has provoked many responses and commentaries.
Norinaga was among the first ones to present the novel in a positive light. He accuses most
Confucian and Buddhism scholars of missing the purpose of the novel, which was not to instruct
in ethics (how not to live). He believes the writing reveals the essence of the Japanese nature,
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namely its emotionalism, effeminate character.98 Norinaga interprets the whole story through the
concept of mono no aware and rejects an interpretation through the ethical categories of good
and evil even though he seems to ground all the other events of the Kojiki in the battle of “good”
and “evil.” Norinaga defines mono no aware in a psychological sense as the ability to
experience the deep trouble of human existence. He continues, by defining good in view of the
mono no aware concept: “those who know the meaning of the sorrow of human sentiments, that
is, those who are in sympathy and harmony with human sentiments, are regarded as good.”99
Genji‟s acts of “extreme iniquity” are not considered good, but are ignored since his ability to
experience “the poignancy of human existence” is more important. His awareness of the sorrow
of human existence makes Genji a good person. Norinaga‟s interpretation of Genji reveals the
significance of mono no aware for his thought as the following passage describes:
The purpose of the Tale of Genji may be likened to the man who, loving the lotus
flower, must collect and store muddy and foul water in order to plant and cultivate
the plant. The impure mud of illicit love affairs described in the Tale is there not
for the purpose of being admired but for the purpose of nurturing the flower of the
awareness of the sorrow of human existence. Prince Genji‟s conduct is like the
lotus flower which is happy and fragrant but which has its roots in filthy muddy
water. But the Tale does not dwell on the impurity of the water; it dwells on those
who are sympathetically kind and who are aware of the sorrow of the human
existence, and it holds these feelings to be the basis of the good man.100
In other words, Norinaga extols a kind heart and the ability to be aware of the “sorrow of
human existence” above right action. Ethically, this creates many difficulties for the Shinto
view. An action that is intuitively accepted as wrong is not really bad if the person who commits
the act produces empathy for others.
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Evil in Norinaga’s Thought
The following section will present a concise summary of the various aspects of
Norinaga‟s concept of evil. Though some insights have been presented throughout the paper
already, this part intends to tie all the loosed threads together to form a clear picture of evil as
presented in Norinaga‟s thought.

Cause of Evil
As his essay on the Fire Deity reveals, Norinaga believes that the birth of the Fire kami is
the cause and the beginning of evil in the world.101 In another writing Norinaga affirms that the
birth of the Fire God marks the beginning of all evils in the world, but the Yomi land is the
original source of evils.102 In either case, in view of Shinto monism, one wonders how he would
explain the existence of evil in the Yomi land. Where did the Yomi land come? Norinaga fails
to address such a question.

Definitions of Evil
Evil as Impurity
As purity is the highest Shinto value, impurity becomes the “anti-value,”103 the most
despised condition in which one can find himself. Defining evil as impurity loses its weight if
one fails to understand the context in which this definition developed. Norinaga‟s equates the
ancient condition of the Japanese to the pure, natural state. To attain that state is the ultimate
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purpose of the Japanese because it represents the condition in which one can “experience once
more the divinity of inner‟s depths.”104 Impurity creates a condition in which one is incapable of
sensing his interconnection to the kami world, which causes him to act in ways contrary to his
nature. One of the definitions for evil provided by Carter relates to this idea: “Obstacles in
producing the spontaneously new we call evil.”105 In this sense, evil is like a problem to be
worked out. The following conclusions can be drawn from the definition of evil as impurity: 1)
evil is inevitable; 2) evil is external, a result of outside forces, not an innate characteristic of the
human nature.

Evil as Inauspiciousness
Evil refers to inauspiciousness, another aspect of impurity. Kenji Ueda indicates that
Norinaga‟s action of equating maga to death reveals the idea that evil deities are those which
“bring about all manners of human unhappiness ultimately leading to death.”106 He sees a
connection between evil and unhappiness, or inauspiciousness, which demonstrates once again
that he does not define evil in ethical terms. Shintoists avoid evil because it can produce unlucky
results. The idea of refraining from evil because of its wrongness does not appear in Shinto (or
is undeveloped). This explains the lack of morals or ethical codes in Shinto to which one would
need to conform. The avoidance of evil because of its ability to bring misfortunes upon oneself
is the guiding principle in life. The conclusion related to the conception of evil as
inauspiciousness is the idea that evil lacks a moral definition, which means: 1) evil cannot be
punished; and 2) evil is avoided for its possible consequences.
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Evil, an Aspect of the Kami Nature
Though it has been referenced already, the definition of kami given by Norinaga provides
an important insight regarding evil as an aspect of the divine nature:
Generally speaking, “kami” denotes, in the first place, the deities of heaven and
earth that appear in the ancient texts and also the spirits enshrined in the shrines;
furthermore, among all kinds of beings—including not only human beings but
also such objects as birds, beasts, trees, grass, mountains, and so forth—any being
whatsoever which possesses some eminent quality out of the ordinary, and is aweinspiring, is called kami. (Eminence here does not refer simply to superiority in
nobility, goodness, or meritoriousness. Evil or queer things, if they are
extraordinarily awe-inspiring, are also called kami.)107
Eminence applies to either gods, humans, or non-human objects. This definition leads
Norinaga to assert that kami can be good or evil. As Frazier points out, “kami” refers to aspects
of experience: awesome, frightful, fascinating, dreadful, etc.108 Even Namihira admits that hare
and kegare are “two varieties of the „sacred‟,”109 which confirms Norinaga‟s view of kami as
both pure and impure. Metaphysically, there is no difference between kami, humans, and nature.
Most important, kami should not be associated with moral goodness or purity. As Norinaga
explained, some kami are good, while others are evil. Goodness is not a characteristic of the
nature of kami. If this view, which seems to be that of the majority of Shinto believers, is
accepted, then evil becomes an aspect of the divine nature and an inescapable reality.110 This
view makes evil internal rather than external. But Shinto believers also define evils as external
forces or things that befall a person. Is then evil internal or external?
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The belief regarding the nature of mitama (soul, or spirit) provides more support for the
view of evil as an internal force. Though various Shinto scholars postulate the belief that a being
possesses four souls under the control of one spirit, a great number of them believe in the
existence of only two spirits within a person. As the Norinaga believes in the latter, I will
discuss the implications of his view. He warns against believing that the ara-mitama (rough,
aggressive spirit) and the nigi-mitama (gentle spirit) are two spirits (or souls). He regards each
as “various manifestations of the same spirit.”111 That explains the reason Norinaga affirmed
that, “When provoked, a good kami may erupt in rage, while evil deities may soften their hearts
when happy, and it is not entirely inconceivable that they might even bestow blessings on
humans.”112 This is possible because each kami possesses these two “spirits:” aramitama, which
is evil and destructive and nigitama, good and creative. Thus, Norinaga believes that evil is an
internal aspect of the kami nature.

Removal of Evil
The solution Shinto provides for the removal of evil consists in the implementation of
purification rituals. Shintoists take part twice a year in one of the most important and solemn
rituals occurring since the beginning of their religion. The goal of this rite is to “remove the
dust” that causes one‟s heart to become opaque and be disrupted from the generative power,
musubi. Impurities removed during this rite can accumulate either because of ignorance or out of
negligence. The ritual opens by the calling upon of the sovereign‟s family and his servants.
After the nature of the emperor‟s rule is stated, a list of the offences from which the nation needs
to be purged is proclaimed. In modern times, before the ritual, the people attending it can write
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their names on a piece of paper, which is later thrown in the water as a representation of the
person‟s offences. The piece of paper becomes a vicarious object carrying the person‟s impurity.
Within the text of the rite, two types of impurities are recognized, heavenly offences and earthly
offences. The following text recited by the priest on the day of the ritual reveals what happens
during the rite and exposes the primitive understanding that Shinto had about offences:
Amongst the various sorts of offences which may be committed in ignorance or
out of negligence by Heaven‟s increasing people . . . [are] breaking the ridges,
filling up watercourses, opening sluices, doubly sowing, planting stakes, flaying
alive, flaying backwards, and dunging; many of such offenses are distinguished as
Heavenly offenses, and as earthly offences: cutting living flesh, cutting dead
flesh, leprosy, proud flesh, the offense committed with one‟s own mother, the
offense committed with one‟s own child, the offense committed with mother and
child, the offense committed with beasts, calamities of crawling worms,
calamities of a god on high, calamities of birds on high, the offenses of killing
beasts and using incantations . . . [the gods] shall carry out to the great sea plain
the offenses which are cleared away and purified, so that there be no remaining
offense . . . [the god of the Breath-blowing-place] shall utterly blow them away
with his breath to the Root-country [Yomi].113
The heavenly offences, the highest possible impurities, are related to destroying
agriculture while the earthly crimes include immodest behavior, contagious diseases, use of
magic, etc. The counting of diseases among the earthly impurities demonstrates that some
impurities (evil states) are not a result of one‟s actions; for instance, no person desires to become
a leper. Also, there is no talk of repentance in this ritual, which reveals that the intent of the
person causing pollution is not important. Natural and moral evils are thrown into the same boat,
so to speak. There is not a differentiation between the two, which again makes one think of the
fact that responsibility for an action does not seem to be on the mind of a Shintoist. How can
one be punished for a calamity? By mixing the two types of impurities, this ritual conveys the
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idea that both are evil, but they are things that “just happen” to people.114 The same idea of
attributing pollution to external causes is seen again in this passage. There are some people who
talk about the similarities between uncleanness in Shinto and the Mosaic Law. However, as one
studies the purpose behind each, it would be clear that they only show similarities on the surfaces
while the differences are enormous. No Shinto theologians discuss purification in relation to a
renewal of the heart. The main reason for purification, either through the misogi (cleansing
through water) or ini (avoidance) or any other method, is to avert potential misfortunes from the
person.115 If there is any talk of kokoro (pure heart), it is in relation to overcoming the
obstructing conditions that disrupt one from allowing the creative force unfold in his life.116 In
other words, the main goal for the removal of pollution is egotistic. Even when a person is
punished for allowing pollution in her life, almost all of the times, it is caused by a fear that the
impurity will bring misfortunes upon the community or the group. In contrast, the cleanliness
rules in the Mosaic Law are rooted in the nature of God. Living in uncleanness in the presence
of a holy and perfect God could bring death. The purpose of the laws was to ensure that the
Israelites could maintain their relationship with the holy God and the motivation behind the
numerous Mosaic laws has been love. Thus, there is a significant difference, rooted in the nature
of the gods, between the two sets of laws.
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A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO THE SHINTO CONCEPT OF EVIL
The purpose of the following section is to analyze the concept of evil in the context of
Shinto, a seemingly optimistic worldview. First, I will pursue the question of whether Shinto
understands the concept of evil in a realistic manner, and then, evaluate whether the Shinto
solution to the challenge of evil proves genuine and optimistic. The thesis proposed is that
Shinto fails in this task and that Christianity demonstrates a greater depth of comprehension of
the problem; thus, the latter describes the world in a more realistic manner. The Christian
position used in the comparison of evil between the two views draws heavily upon Augustine‟s
work regarding the problem of evil. First, a brief overview of Augustine‟s thought regarding evil
is offered. Then, after analyzing the various definitions of evil proposed by Norinaga, I will
evaluate the solution for evil‟s removal presented by Shinto. The purpose of this critical analysis
is to pinpoint the pessimism of the “supposedly optimistic” Shinto religion in contrast to the
hopeful Christian solution.

Augustine on Evil
The difficulty of understanding and formulating a position regarding the problem of evil
that would be consistent with the Christian belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent God preoccupied Augustine throughout his life.117 For Christians, evil becomes
a real problem in view of their understanding of God. How can a powerful, good God allow the
existence of evil in the world? This would not be a problem for the Christian if either God is not
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omnipotent or he is not omnibenevolent. However, Augustine accepted the view that is most
commonly known as standard traditional theism, which maintains that an all-powerful, allknowing, and wholly good God exists. Since the Creator of all things is God, Augustine
searched to understand metaphysical evil. He grappled with the reality that life in a world
created by a good God is fraught with suffering and evil.118
Augustine‟s early association with the Manicheans certainly influenced his thought about
evil.119 As a dualist system, Manichaeism was based on the idea of the eternal struggle between
good and evil, light and darkness. Mani (216-276), its founder, explained that the two
substances have existed as finite forces separate from each other from the beginning of the
world. Matter was associated with evil or darkness while spirit was identified with goodness or
light.120 Warren T. Smith describes this system as a “pseudo-philosophical faith” that appealed
to the young “pseudo-intellectual” Augustine.121 Though eager to understand the writings of
Manichaeus, the inability of the system to provide satisfying answers for his perplexities caused
Augustine to drift away from this sect.122 Because of the influence of this system upon his
thought in his early years, Augustine believed evil to be a substance. Later, after his conversion,
influenced by Neoplatonism, Augustine sought to refute the dualism of Manichaeism.
The following three aspects of evil as presented in Augustine‟s works will clarify his
position and provide a starting point in the comparison with Norinaga‟s view: 1) nature of evil;
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2) origin of evil; and 3) “the principle of plenitude.” First, Augustine believed that the nature of
God is good.123 As the creator of the world, he must have created everything. Since he is good
and could not create evil, no created thing can be intrinsically evil: “therefore whatever is, is
good.”124 Thus, evil cannot be “something,” a substance, as the Manicheans understood it, “for
were it a substance, it would be good.”125 Thus, Augustine defined evil as privatio boni, or
privation of good. As he explains it in his work, “For the Almighty God, who, as even the
heathens acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good,
would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if he were not so
omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil
but the absence of good?”126 In other words, evil refers to a lack in something that should be
there. Blindness is evil because the ability of the eyes to see is absent. In this way, as evil is not
a substance, even though God created everything, he did not create evil.
The second aspect of Augustine‟s thought refers to the origin of evil. It is significant to
mention that all things created are good, in Augustine‟s view, but corruptible.

Since creation is

ex nihilo, the source of evil can be found in the nothingness from which goods were created.
Also, as a corollary, the created being must of necessity be less than the infinite Creator, thus
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finite.127 The finitude of created goods makes evil possible because a good may be diminished
or increased.128
The ultimate solution to the problem of evil in Augustine‟s view is free will. The ability
to choose is a good gift from God, but it brings with it the ability of actualizing evil. However,
the existence of moral agents capable of choosing between good and evil is better than the lack
of free willed humans: “Just as a stray horse is better than a stone which is not astray, since the
stone does not have its own motion or perception, so the creature who sins of his own free will is
more excellent than the creature who does not sin because he has no free will.”129 However, if
one asks how the evil will arose, Augustine‟s response is that pride brought evil into the world.
Pride is “craving for undue exaltation. And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons
Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself.”130
In many of his treatises, Augustine recognizes a hierarchic order of existence. 131 Living
things are above non-living things; sentient beings are greater than non-sentient ones; intelligent
sentient things are above the ones that have no intelligence; and the immortal, intelligent beings
are above the mortal, men.132 The complexity of the universe is good because it reflects God‟s
goodness in many ways. Hick uses the phrase “principle of plenitude” to describe Augustine‟s
view of the world containing a variety of creatures.133 This principle makes the universe richer
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and better, in Augustine‟s view, and explains God‟s reason for creating other beings beside
angels. While this provides only a brief overview of Augustine‟s treatment of the problem of
evil, it is enough to provide a framework for the comparison with Norinaga‟s thought.
Evil: Norinaga vs. Augustine
A critique of Norinaga‟s view is offered first, followed by a comparison to the Christian
position regarding evil. The answers each scholar offered to the problem of evil and suffering
developed from their understanding of divinity in the context of their religion. Because the
nature of divinity in the two religious systems influences the concept of evil greatly, to clarify
their positions, I will address the implications of each view. This attempt to analyze critically
and to compare Norinaga and Augustine‟s views cannot be comprehensive. One, Christians
recognize that the problem of evil cannot be fully resolved because of its complexity. Second, a
simple analysis of either position could cover large volumes, especially Augustine‟s since he
grappled with the problem more.
Norinaga‟s thought regarding the kami nature is summarized in the following statements:
(1) Musubi no kami produced all things and events in the world
(2) No kami possesses omnipotence or omniscience
(3) Kami are good and evil, pure and impure and their actions accord to that nature134
(4) Every kami possesses a Rough Divine Spirit (aramitama) and a Gentle Divine Spirit
(nigitama)135
(5) All events, good and evil, in the life of an individual are the work of the gods136
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(6) The things of the world alternate between good and evil
What are the logical implications of believing in kami as the creator of both good and
evil? Accepting that musubi is not only associated with that which is morally good, as the
Western concept of deity connotes, forces the Shintoists to accept that the creative, life-giving
force involves both the disruptive and corrective powers. Thus, evil originates within this power.
Norinaga‟s view of evil seems to reveal a certain type of internal dualism within the kami nature.
Carter characterizes the Shinto view as a “dualistic-non-dualism” that finds the source of evil
within. Either way, most scholars describe Shinto in monistic terms. The belief entailed is that
both good and evil are instances of the divine spirit since everything had been created through
the mysterious power of Musubi no kami.
If the following statement is added to the other six items that Norinaga believes, a
contradiction seems to result:
(7) Kami created the humans with a pure nature.
If Norinaga asserts that Musubi no kami is all good, that would contradict item (4). Thus,
even the kami behind the creation of everything must be influenced by the evil nature within.
One could argue that kami‟s actions would be determined by the aspect of his spirit that is
functioning at the time, either his Rough Spirit or his Gentle Spirit. It is believed in Shinto that
worship or rituals can pacify one‟s aramitama. Thus, Musubi no kami‟s aramitama must have
been under control when he created humans with a pure nature. Otherwise, how would it be
possible to affirm that humans possess a pure nature? However, when talking about Magatsubi,
Norinaga mentions that “there is no remedy for the fury of its august mind.”137 That means that
at times his aramitama could not be pacified. How can one believe a ritual would work for one
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kami but not for another (if pacification is possible through ritual)? Thus, it seems that the
creation process has been influenced by the evil found within the latent workings of the
mysterious divine spirit of Musubi no kami. Was it possible for Musubi no kami to create beings
of a pure nature even though his nature is not associated only with goodness? As F.H. Bradley
indicates, “it is an illusion to suppose that imperfection, once admitted into Deity, can be stopped
precisely at that convenient limit which happens to suit our ideas [emphasis mine].”138 What
assurance does a Shinto has in asserting that Musubi no kami was able to subdue his aramitama
in order to produce something pure? If the creative principle is imperfect or impure, the effect
cannot be perfect or pure. Stating that Musubi no kami has an evil aspect which did not affect
the creation of humans is ungrounded for the Shinto believer. On what basis a Shinto affirms
that is not clear. Thus, the following premise logically follows from the Shinto beliefs and could
be added to the set of propositions Norinaga believes:
(8) The imperfect, impure creative force cannot create pure beings.
However, Shinto (including Norinaga) admits that (7) is true, which contradicts (8).
Thus, there is at least one logical inconsistency in Norinaga‟s view. However, even if one
concedes that Musubi no kami‟s aramitama was not involved in the generation of humans, the
causal relation between the divine couple and humans is an “intrinsic causal relation.” Aquinas
argued that an effect must resemble its cause because one cannot offer what he does not have. 139
Whatever one offers is what he has. Thus, as humans cannot give birth to angels, neither can the
impure kami generate pure human beings. The logical inconsistency remains.
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In addition, Norinaga asserts that humans detest evil and will to do the good. He believes
everyone has a natural inclination for doing good: “Since human beings were thus created by the
spirit of Musubi no kami so as to detest evil and do what is good, they know for themselves what
they should do without being taught.”140 Thus, Norinaga believes:
(9) Humans naturally know and follow an innate code that extols goodness and
denounces evil.
First, as seen, since evil is a part of the nature of the kami, one wonders how can that evil
be subdued in order to create good things. The musubi principle permeating all forms of life is
not morally good. If this same creative force is part of the human nature, it is hard to understand
how human nature equates goodness in Shinto thought. Second, if “natural” describes the nature
of the kami, then to do evil becomes “natural” because evil is a characteristic of the nature of
kami, or of the life generating principle that created all things. From the attitude of detesting evil
logically follows that one should also despise an aspect of his/her nature, or an aspect of life.
Moreover, to affirm that doing good is the goal of the human implies that there is a standard of
goodness that people seek to reach. It has to be something beyond the musubi force since the life
force is not morally good. Otherwise, good and evil become relative. If both aspects are within
the musubi, there is a difficulty in differentiating between the two. What is good? What is evil?
Even if one concedes that humans can be pure, that causes another problem for the Shinto
view. Since humans are pure, Shintoists have postulated the idea that evil (and impurity)
“cannot originate in man or in this world. It is an intruder.”141 Ono continues by describing
moral evil as the incapacitating of man for normal action. Thus, there cannot be a punishment
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for any evil since it is nonsense to talk of a bad intent of the one committing the bad act; the
person is not carrying out an evil deed, but some external force causes him to act wrongly. This
is the reason Shinto regards evil as external. However, it has been shown that good and evil are
aspects of the life-generating force, musubi. Can evil be both internal and external if the same
“divine blood” flows through all living and non-living things in the world, as Shinto affirms?
In addition, by explaining evil deeds as the result of either some “temporary affliction” or
some external force, Shinto offers a rather dismal depiction of the world. People can hope that
no afflictions will befall them, but there is no assurance for hoping such. Also, since all events,
good and evil, are the outcome of the will of ambivalent deities, the most one can hope is that the
kami are in a good mood when dealing with them. There are major differences between the will
of the kami and the will of God. In Norinaga‟s conception, the suffering of good people and
prosperity of evil people has no purpose. There is no possibility of redeeming evil as in
Christianity. The best action in life, according to the Shinto teaching, is to struggle to maintain
one‟s purity because that might ward off misfortune. However, the account of Izanagi‟s
pollution demonstrates that pollution can just occur to someone. Shinto does not present an
optimistic outlook in life. First, humans seem to have no control over their actions. Second,
Shinto scholars portray the influence of the external forces on one‟s life as inevitable. There is
no free will since all things, good and evil, depend on the external forces, or kami in Norinaga‟s
theology, and nothing could hinder the occurrence of evil from materializing. Is there any way
of dealing with evil then? Or should one accept that “troublesome things are bound to happen”
in this world,142 as Norinaga pointed out, and one should live hoping he will not experience too
much evil?
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The difficulty of offering a way of judging between good and evil stems from the Shinto
view of kami. If good and evil are aspects of the kami nature, then defining good becomes
problematic. Norman Geisler‟s question points out this dilemma: “How can such a strange,
dualistic combination of opposites of good and evil be absorbed into the nature of God?”143 The
assimilation of opposites within the same creative principle creates difficulties for the Shinto
believer. Can the deity be described as good? Since the Shinto spirit possesses two aspects, the
kami nature looks like a sponge permeated by two different fluids, good and evil. The fluids mix
within the sponge and become one liquid. What does “kami is good” mean in this context? It
seems that good and evil are mixed within the same divine nature so that there is a problem of
differentiating between the two. Thus, it is hard to even know what quality or property “good”
or “evil” convey.
In contrast to Norinaga, Augustine maintains the existence of an infinite, all-powerful,
good God who is separate from his creation. The problem of understanding/defining good and
evil disappears as the existence of the theistic God implies that there is a moral law that judges
between good and evil.144 The Shinto worldview cannot even differentiate between good and
evil even though most writings illogically infer an objective standard in order to make sense of
life. Norinaga postulates the belief in absolutes which creates even more problems as it will be
shown later. Even the possibility of a good creation, a major Shinto feature, cannot be believed
given the nature of the kami. However, the Christian position identifies good in relationship to
the perfect being of God. The nature of God, as Augustine also explained, determines the nature
of his creation. Thus, “realities distinct from God that have a genuine and good existence of
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their own [exist].”145 It is true that the problem of the existence of evil in a theistic world
remains.
The Shinto adherent is not confronted with a philosophical problem of evil as the
Christian is. For the former, evil does not pose a problem for divinity. However, throughout the
Bible, the cries of the believers who struggle with the existence of evil are recorded. Habakkuk
wonders what the reason of a good and just God for permitting evil could be: “Why do you make
me look at injustice? Why do you tolerate wrong?”146 The psalmist echoes the same concern
with how to make sense of the circumstances taking place when he knows God exists: “How
long, O, Lord? Will you forget me forever? How long will you hide your face from me?”147
Tragedies and suffering cause Christians to ask these questions, but without a moral
context they are meaningless.148 Without a moral law to judge between good and evil, no action
can be regarded as either good or evil. The annihilation of millions of Jews by the Nazi regime
cannot be classified as evil in a world in which no absolutes are posited. In a sense, Shinto has
this problem. Though its adherents name an event good and another evil, their cosmology
associated to their beliefs of divinity does not allow them to make such comments. To go even
further, the “why” of evil does not make much sense in the context of the Shinto worldview.
There is no reason or purpose for the suffering that humans experience, Norinaga asserts. One
can only live to see what will happen next. Thus, to use Zacharias‟ words, where is Shinto when
it hurts?149
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There are various approaches that the Christian uses to respond to the challenge evil
poses. In view of the theistic belief of God‟s nature, there seems to be a prima facie logical
inconsistency between the claims that God exist and that evil exists. One approach to address
this problem, used by Augustine and further developed by Alvin Plantinga, is the free-will
defense. First, as Augustine defined evil as privation of goodness, he emphasized that evil was
not created by God. In his free-will defense, Plantinga develops some aspects of Augustine‟s
position and seeks to demonstrate that the existence of God and the reality of evil are compatible
without making God the cause of evil (and he succeeded). He demurred that the actualization of
the world was partly up to the free willed agents and not up to God if humans were significantly
free.150 He then continues his argument by proving that “it was not within God‟s power to create
a world containing moral good but no moral evil.”151 Thus, he proves that the existence of evil
derives from free will, a position Augustine held. Though in this world not all evil one
experiences results from his actions, free-will made evil actual in the world. Augustine and
Plantinga believed that God‟s prevention or removal of all suffering would not create a better
world because it would remove the good of freedom. In this way, the free-will defense proves
the logical consistency of the theistic belief. In Augustine‟s case, he also offers a reason why
evil exists in a world created by a good God. It is significant to emphasize again that this
Christian position offers a reasonable explanation for the existence of evil in the world in
contrast to the Shinto view.
Another way to approach the problem of evil is the natural law theodicy, as presented by
C.S. Lewis in The Problem of Pain. He proposed the idea that the uniformity of the natural
150

Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1974),

151

Ibid., 45

39-44.

54

world is a necessary condition for morality. God had to create an environment with fixed laws
which could not be manipulated for one‟s benefit.152 If people live in such a neutral field
characterized by constant laws, it is clear that causing evil and pain is a possibility. 153 A bad
person can throw a rock at another and, because of its hardness, the rock will injure the latter.
God decides not to intervene and stop every instance in which a human being abuses his free will
for, if He did, that would be the end of life: “Try to exclude the possibility of suffering which the
order of nature and the existence of free wills involve, and you find that you have excluded life
itself.”154 Thus, some evil is a result of the conditions that God created so that life and morality
would be possible.
The Christian approaches to the problem of evil mentioned do not posit the idea that evil
is a necessary aspect of the nature of God‟s creation, but that God‟s allowing evil is actually
justified. To quote Augustine, “the sins themselves or the unhappiness itself are not necessary
for the perfection of the whole; but the souls are necessary as souls. If they so will, they sin.” 155
The souls must have the power to choose and, thus, the possibility to sin, if they are truly free.
However, the cause of sin is negative, not positive, according to Augustine.156 The turning away
of the free will from God which causes sin “is a defective movement, and a defect comes from
nothing. . . . Yet, since the defect lies in the will, it is under our control.”157 The view of evil as
negative is a major difference between Augustine and Norinaga since the latter regards evil as a
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positive force. After all, evil is an aspect of the kami nature and of the whole world. To reuse
the metaphor of the sponge which represents the kami-nature, this appears to be the only way of
seeing the world, namely as evil. Augustine maintained that God had a morally sufficient reason
to permit evil while Norinaga cannot conceive of a world without evil. Norinaga‟s system
presents a grim picture because the kami inflict pain/ evil upon the people for no purpose. One
can only survive and try to appease the kami. However, even Norinaga admits that no one can
subdue the Evil Kami, Magatsubi, when his fury rages. Augustine holds that suffering serves an
outweighing good in the Christian system. The theistic God controls all things and provides the
optimism Shinto promises but fails to deliver.
Some might argue that Norinaga‟s position that regards evil as positive seems more
realistic than Augustine‟s view, which entails that evil is unreal (even illusory). For instance, the
wickedness of human beings is very real, its presence felt in powerful ways at times. Is it not
unrealistic to call wicked acts a privation of goodness, or an instance of non-being? In defending
Augustine‟s position, Donald A. Cress provides two important insights: 1) evil is meontic rather
than oukontic; and 2) evil is real and positive not in and of itself, but because of the agent or
action that possesses being, thus being a real and positive thing.158 Cress clarifies the fact that
Augustine is aware that evil is felt vividly and forcefully. However, if one fails to understand
Augustine‟s view of evil as a “lack in some good thing, which, on account of that lack, is
disordered, out of proper alignment with its form, mode and species,”159 one can accuse him of
being insensitive, even cruel. To affirm that evil is non-being means that the thing called evil
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fails to conduct according to its perfect nature or standard of excellence.160 Evil refers to
disordered and defective goods. Because evil is “a good thing run amok,”161 the “realness” of
evil is caused by the realness of the good thing. Thus, the objection that Augustine‟s privation
theory entails an illusory view of evil is unfounded.
Another critique of Norinaga‟s system is provided by the use of intuition. Since Shinto
accepts intuition as a valid tool in the acquisition of knowledge, I would like to explore the
beliefs of Norinaga that seem to have been based on intuition rather than reason and the “sacred”
writings. Shinto rejects the notion of absolute good and evil. Wargo maintains the idea that
Shinto accepts cultural subjectivism: “What was counted as good or evil [in Shinto] depended
very much on the specific conditions obtaining as well as on the nature of the community to
which one belonged.”162 Also, Sokyo Ono affirms that no action is intrinsically good or evil
because there are no absolutes.163 This seems the prevalent view in Shinto. Does intuition
support such a view? For instance, acts of humanity and loyalty are always good. Killing an
innocent person though is intuitively accepted as evil, even by Shintoists. If no absolute good
exists, killing an innocent person could not be regarded as intrinsically evil, but intuition appears
to point to an objective moral standard.
Several comments that Norinaga made implied the idea of an absolute system even
though he defined good and evil as relative in other passages. He affirms that humans know
intuitively what they should do because they were created with this ability through the spirit of
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Musubi no kami.164 Also, he claims that humans were created to detest evil and do what is good.
His affirmation implies that one could recognize what good is, and that there are some absolutes
that do not change with the cultures. For instance, he claims that “acts of humanity,
righteousness, propriety, deference, filial piety, brotherly respect, loyalty and faithfulness should
be innate to human beings, and people should know these and behave accordingly, without being
taught explicitly.”165 He shows no indication the value of some moral actions change culturally.
Norinaga believes that there are certain things people naturally know they are supposed to do
while others things should not be done. In other words, some actions are naturally accepted as
good and others are intuitively regarded as evil. However, Norinaga did not find himself bound
to accept the reality of moral truths. In a sense, he affirms their reality, but at the same time
scorns the idea of ethical systems. Spontaneous, intuitive action should guide human beings in
the everyday life. In his view, if humans would return to the state in which they were created
and rejected the imposition of any ethical codes, people would do what they are supposed to do.
However, if there are things humans should do, what is wrong with the compilation of such
expectations in an ethical code? A Christian would affirm that Norinaga is correct in
recognizing the reality of an innate moral law. Intuition seems to have taught him that a moral
law exists; intuition demonstrates that the Shinto rejection of absolutes is wrong. Thus, good and
evil are absolutes. But, in discussing the Tale of Genji, Norinaga declares that good and evil are
relative. Is this a contradiction in his thought?
On one hand, he appeals to absolutes to prove the goodness (purity) of human nature as it
was initially created. On the other hand, he defines good in relative terms. However, most
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would agree that he believed in the absolute truthfulness of the Ancient Way. The events of the
Age of the Kami reveal how the Shinto must live. Thus, the actions of the kami provide the
absolute law/code. In a sense, then, he believed in absolutes. At least, his statements entail the
reality of absolutes. That would not be accepted by Shinto as portraying their view of truth and
morality. However, it is the position that follows from Norinaga‟s writings.
If the set of statements (1) through (7) is accepted, then evil cannot be an external,
separate force because that gives birth to a dualistic view of the world. But all organic and
inorganic things are kami and part of the musubi force. By defining evil as an external force (as
so many Shintoists do), they commit a fallacy. The notion of evil as external contradicts their
understanding of kami. If evil is external, then a dualism is accepted, which is contrary to Shinto
claims. Shinto writes against a dualism of good and evil. Thus, this creative and generative
power is fighting within itself; sometimes it obstructs while other times it creates. This also
reveals that declaring Shintoism an optimistic faith is illogical. The idea of harmony and unity
seems irreconcilable to the Shinto belief that the same force that generates the good and
harmonious is also the force that brings destruction and wields woe.
Regarding the question of whether anything could be done regarding the evil in this
world, the Shinto position reveals another problem. Norinaga reveals that he believed in the
final victory of good over evil even though his system fails to provide any assurance. One
wonders at the optimist expectation of Shinto, namely that “this world in which we live is
progressing from chaos to order, from the confusion of contradictions to a state of harmony and
unity.”166 A kami finite in power who has limited control of the world cannot assure one of any
outcome, much less a positive one. Norinaga believes in a deterministic world in which all
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events and acts are determined by the will of the kami. Given his conception of the kami-nature,
his belief in the final victory of good over evil is unfounded. First, good kami are not stronger
than evil ones and both kinds of gods are finite. Referring to Magatsubi, Norinaga affirms that
not even Amaterasu could subdue or resist his fury.167 For Norinaga, evil necessarily exists;168 it
is an inevitable effect of an imperfect world that alternates from good to evil and then from evil
to good. However, it does not logically follow that ultimate good will eventually triumph. On
the contrary, given the nature of kami, the conclusion that the Shintoist cannot maintain hope in
this world logically follows. One wonders on what evidence Norinaga sustains his view of the
triumph of ultimate good since good forces do not seem stronger than evil forces. Second, the
problem of death, the greatest evil, fails to be addressed by the Shinto. Not only is there no
solution for the conquering of death, but the destiny of all people is to go to the land of Yomi,
according to Norinaga. A person that suffers horrendous evils in this life cannot expect anything
better after death. Augustine presents the biblical view that there will be a final punishment of
erring free-willed choices, introducing an idea of justice that is lacking in Shinto. There is a
differentiation between the destinies of people based on their actions in this life; all people do not
go to Hades, the equivalent of the Shinto Yomi land.
Another aspect of Norinaga‟s thought, his high-regard of spontaneity, adds more
problems. Accepting that the human nature cannot be pure since the musubi force is impure and
evil, spontaneous action cannot produce the natural, pure actions Norinaga expects as a result. In
addition, spontaneity presupposes chance, not order. If chance characterizes the Shinto world, it
would be hard to maintain the position that good will ultimately triumph. Norinaga‟s system
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offers false certainty; it believes in the victory of good, but fails to offer real hope for this
conviction.
In Christianity, even the existence of evil is purposeful. Though good does not need evil
in order to exist, God has a morally sufficient reason to permit evil. Augustine explains this idea
simply but concisely in the following passage:
Nor can we doubt that God does well even in the permission of what is evil. For
He permits it only in the justice of His judgment. And surely all that is just is
good. Although, therefore, evil, on so far as it is evil, is not a good; yet the fact
that evil as well as good exists, is a good. For if it were not a good that evil
should exist, its existence would not be permitted by the omnipotent God. . .169
The belief in an all-powerful, good God assures Christians that evils will be removed
some day. The seemingly optimistic character of Shinto is unfounded while Christianity is truly
optimistic. Moral and natural evils are not too much of a problem for Shinto because the kami
are not omnipotent, omnibenevolent, or omniscient. They are problems only for the theistic God.
But theism can and does offer various defenses to the problem of evil while Shinto‟s views are
either contradictory or rather pessimistic.
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CONCLUSION
What then is good? Norinaga defines good as either purity or auspiciousness. He
constantly avoids defining good as virtue or a moral quality. Is good that which accomplishes
the greatest or most desired outcome? Or is it the virtuous action? Or is doing good referring to
the action that fulfills one‟s moral obligation? It seems that Norinaga affirms that good refers to
the deed that maintains or obtains one‟s purity. Since purity in Shinto synthesizes the concepts
of truth, goodness, and beauty, Norinaga‟s position reveals a different picture of Shinto than one
is expected to find.
Shinto fails to offer the optimism it pretends to offer. The finitude and lack of power of
the kami do not provide any assurance that good will ultimately triumph against evil. Even in
the present life, as all things and events depends on the will of capricious, ambivalent kami,
people find no confidence that life can become better. As Norinaga repeatedly remarks, good
people suffer evil and evil people experience good lives. He concludes that evil kami are
causing these situations, but offers no help since his position cannot assure one that good will
prevail. These difficulties do not exist for the Christian who believes in the omnipotent,
omnibenevolent God. Though evil still exists, one day all evil will be removed. Augustine
points out that all God‟s actions are a result of his character. Thus, one can be assured he has a
purpose and a morally justified reason for the allowance of evil and suffering.
Shinto is known as the religion of no founder, no sacred text, no moral codes, and no
absolutes. If one accepts the definition of purity that Shinto provides, he would also have to
accept the absolute nature of goodness that Norinaga presents. Even though he fails to define it,
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his writings reveal a system in which goodness is implied as an aspect of purity, the allencompassing concept that includes truth, goodness, and beauty. However, he would reject a
description of his view in absolute terms. He avoided drawing conclusions that contradicted
Ancient Shinto. Thus, he defined good and evil as Shinto would define it; that is, he focused on
the concept of purity, but he failed to understand it as the integration of truth, goodness, and
beauty. Though Shinto define purity in light of right, clean, bright, and straight, it refuses to
draw the conclusions this definition would logically entail. To even propose that purity is the
ideal state is to accept some absolute—purity.
A Christian might affirm that Norinaga might have learned of the reality of absolute truth
and morality because his intuition pointed in that way, but he rejected it since it did not fit within
his system. The Christian might assert that the image of God within every human being causes
people to acquire knowledge of some truths and that explains why intuition leads people to
accept absolute truth. Norinaga stayed within the confines of the Shinto system and sought to
explain his views as clearly as possible, but whenever a contradiction would follow, he accepted
it because the Ancient Way presented the ultimate truth. One wonders what could have been
accomplished if Norinaga had allowed himself to step out of the boundary the Shinto religion
imposed upon his thought.
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